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The citizen versus consumer hypothesis:
Evidence from a contingent valuation survey
John A. Curtis and Kenneth E. McConnell*
This paper examines the criticism of contingent valuation put forth by Blamey,
Common and Quiggin (Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics,
1995, vol. 39, pp. 264±288). They argue that households have consistent preferences
over private goods but not jointly consistent preferences over public and private
goods and, hence, contingent valuation cannot uncover meaningful responses for the
valuation of public goods. In this paper we argue that the motives that are
manifested in choices for public goods can be explained in two ways. One is the
model of the citizen, proposed by Blamey et al. (1995). The second is a model of
neoclassical preferences with altruism. Given these alternative and competing
explanations of choices for public goods, what matters is whether they imply
dierences in willingness to pay for public goods. We provide statistical evidence
from a contingent valuation study of the control of deer in the USA that there is no
dierence in willingness to pay between those who profess `citizen' or altruistic
preferences and the rest of the presumably purely private respondents.
1. Introduction
Most researchers have concluded that contingent valuation (CV) methods or,
more generally stated, preferences approaches, work satisfactorily when used
to value private goods and public goods with discernable services. Whether
these same methods work to value public goods that provide non-use values
is more debatable. The literature has provided two broad arguments against
CV. One argument, espoused for example by Diamond and Hausman (1994),
holds that responses to CV questions and the implied willingness to pay are
too noisy and contradictory to stem from well-de®ned preferences. A second
argument, best developed by Tversky and Kahneman (1991), poses a
psychological model of behaviour as an alternative to the neoclassical model,
and interprets particular anomalies such as the embedding eect and the
divergence between the willingness to pay and the willingness to accept, as
evidence in support of the psychological model. In a recent paper, Blamey,
Common and Quiggin (1995) provide a third and more complex criticism:
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The Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 46:1, pp. 69±83that households have consistent preferences over private goods but not
jointly consistent preferences over public and private goods and, hence, CV
cannot uncover meaningful responses for valuation of public goods.
Blamey et al. (1995, p. 264) argue that when respondents answer CV
questions they `may be expressing social or political judgements rather than
preferences over consumption bundles'. Their argument is supported by
statistical evidence showing that responses to dichotomous choice CV
questions are better explained by socioeconomic variables indicative of a
citizen's political views, than by the standard economic variables that would
explain consumer behaviour. The Blamey et al. (1995) critique is more
damaging to CV because it implies that the preferences that allow trade-os
between public and private goods cannot be constructed, no matter how
good the CV mechanism, and no matter how cleverly researchers avoid the
pitfalls implied by psychological models. Furthermore, the Blamey et al.
(1995) model provides an alternative explanation of the empirical regular-
ities, something that cannot be said for the Diamond and Hausman (1994)
critique nor the psychological model.
In this paper we argue that the motives that are manifested in choices for
public goods can be explained in two ways. One model is based on the
`citizen', as proposed by Blamey et al. (1995). The second is a model of
neoclassical preferences with altruism. Given these alternative and competing
explanations of choices for public goods, what matters is whether they imply
dierences in willingness to pay for public goods. We provide statistical
evidence from a CV study of the control of deer in the USA that there is no
dierence in the willingness to pay between individuals who profess `citizen'
or altruistic preferences to some of the aspects of deer control and the rest of
the respondents. The latter respondents, those who do not reveal themselves
as altruistic in the sense of the question asked may, nevertheless, be more
narrowly altruistic and citizen-minded. In the end, what matters is whether
the valuations dier because the motives dier because, ultimately, collective
choice must cope with the cost of public goods. Whether the preferences are
those of citizens or consumers, the willingness to pay for the public good does
not dier in our example.
2. Background
Debate about the nature of preferences has been stimulated by the use of the
dichotomous choice CV model that is put in the form of a referendum. Often
the question is posed so that the respondent `votes' yes or no, rather than
chooses a commodity bundle with a price. The strategy of using mechanisms
such as referenda and payment devices such as taxes may change both the
setting and the incentives for responding in comparison to private good
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contingent valuation addresses public rather than private goods, respondents
will answer not in their best private interest but as citizens. A `citizen'
response considers the wider interest of the community. An example used to
lend support to this hypothesis is evidence that willingness to pay (WTP) for
wildlife preservation is generated in part by the ethical belief that wildlife has
the right to exist independent of human preferences or activities (Stevens
et al. 1991, 1993). Blamey et al. (1995) also argue that their empirical results
show evidence of `citizen' responses.
The issue is posed clearly by Blamey et al. (1995): contingent valuation
provides information on how the political process would respond when the
focus is on public goods, but not information that can be used in bene®t±cost
analysis. This is contrary to the valuation use of CV, which purports to
provide responses that can be used to estimate mean WTP for bene®t±cost
analysis. Blamey et al. (1995) argue that responses are meaningful but should
be interpreted within the referendum metaphor as expressions of voters'
preferences for public goods. We argue that the responses are consistent with
altruistic preferences, and that the WTP measures can be used in bene®t±cost
analysis.
1 This is similar to the argument of Rolfe and Bennett (1996). They
use the example of the purchase of a birthday present as a choice that is not
explained by a consumer model of pure self-interest, but then suggest that the
child's utility in the parent's preference function can explain the choice (Rolfe
and Bennett 1996, p. 130).
The model constructed by Nyborg (2000) puts the argument formally.
Individuals respond with one set of preferences for public decisions and
another set for private decisions.
2 Nyborg (2000) suggests that preferences on
social choices may look similar to private preferences with altruism, but
cautions that the two sets of preferences are conceptually dierent. By
interpreting the `citizen' response as altruism, one can see that the social
welfare function of Nyborg (2000) can be made to behave precisely the same
as an individual's personal preference function with altruism.
The Nyborg (2000) model may be considered a special case of a broader
understanding of preferences. In general, individuals are likely to have
dierent preferences for dierent motives Ð a consumer may not like rock
1As long as the altruism is not purely non-paternalistic altruism. Numerous authors (see, for
example, Madariaga and McConnell 1987) have shown that with non-paternalistic altruism,
the bene®t±cost outcome will be independent of whether altruism is included in the bene®ts.
Blamey et al. (1995) note this on page 270.
2Sago (1988) also sees a dichotomy; for example, individuals act as citizens when making
`hard' decisions concerning the environment and as consumers when concerned with `personal
or self-regarding wants and interests'.
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In the public goods case, there are several reasons why it may not make a
dierence what kinds of preferences prevail. First, the individual may be
acting out of altruism but assessing a completely private preference function,
rather than a citizen's function. Survey evidence cannot tell us which kind of
preference function prevails. Second, the WTP may not dier.
A growing volume of literature suggests that the demand for private goods
is motivated not only by private interest, following classical economic theory,
but also by altruistic motives. Most attention has focused on the provision of
public goods, such as environmental preservation (Johansson 1987; Loomis
1988). Kalt and Zupan (1984) have suggested that altruistic motivation
in¯uencing choice can be economically rational and not a re¯ection of `non-
economic' behaviour. Holmes (1990) ®nds that both altruistic motivations, as
well as a narrow self-interest, in¯uence choices related to environmental
health risk by individuals. On the magnitude of in¯uence he ®nds that regard
for others' safety has about the same impact as regard for one's own safety in
voting concerning environmental regulations. Altruistic preferences partially
derive from ethical beliefs. For example, an ethical belief that assistance
should be given to the poor in society gives rise to satisfaction from having
some form of social support for the indigent. Is the individual a `consumer' or
`citizen' when he/she demonstrates a willingness to give part of his/her own
income for such a social support system? For Sago (1988) this would be a
`hard' decision and therefore the individual acts as a citizen. But one's ethical
beliefs often determine decisions that are clearly `consumer' decisions:
whether to eat meat, wear fur, or wear clothes made with child labour. These
private decisions induce social consequences, and consumers often modify
their consumption behaviour to re¯ect social values. Community-minded
survey responses can simply be a re¯ection of altruistic motivations. For
example, concern for safety in environmental regulations as discussed by
Holmes (1990), some of which he attributes to altruism, would be considered
`citizen'-type voting under the Blamey et al. (1995) hypothesis.
In the empirical section of this paper we investigate whether respondents
who apparently respond to a referendum-type CV question from the
perspective of citizens, express a willingness to pay which is dierent from
those who respond based on their private preferences. This empirical task
does not test whether someone is a citizen or consumer but, rather, given that
we have identi®ed from other sources a designation for citizen or consumer,
whether the individuals behave dierently. The citizen hypothesis is not an
empirically testable hypothesis but is a maintained hypothesis because the
citizen hypothesis concerns the individuals' underlying motives and these
motives are never conclusively revealed in actual behaviour or survey
responses. Rather, we will show that respondents who could be interpreted as
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the public good), dierent from others answering the contingent valuation
questionnaire. Being unable to distinguish between respondents with altruism
and citizen-type respondents is an indication that community-minded
respondents might be mistakenly interpreted as `citizens' instead of individ-
uals with certain kinds of altruistic motives and the fact that their willingness
to pay does not dier makes the distinction insigni®cant, at least for this
application. Consequently, it is reasonable to proceed with the measurement
of WTP, even when the choices are not motivated by purely private bene®ts
from the purchases.
The empirical analysis proceeds as follows. Data from a contingent
valuation proposal eliciting potentially community-minded responses was
chosen. This dataset also contained questions that helped to identify
respondents with altruistic preferences. An indirect utility function, which
incorporates a parameter for altruistic respondents, was estimated. The
empirical test involved testing for statistical signi®cance of the parameter
associated with the altruistic individuals. Willingness to pay was also
calculated for comparison across dierent types of individuals.
3. The survey data on willingness to pay for deer control
Our analysis was based on a telephone survey of Maryland households that
principally reside in the suburbs of Washington D.C. and in the greater
metropolitan area of Baltimore. The survey was designed to collect
information on preferences for future deer management policies in Mary-
land. Large deer populations in the State aorded many bene®ts to residents
of Maryland but also caused considerable damage to property.
3 Extensive
populations of deer destroyed household shrubs and gardens, caused
numerous trac accidents and consumed large quantities of agricultural
crops, especially corn. The control of deer could have been considered a
public good because it extended bene®ts to many people at once. The bene®ts
of deer control are Lyme disease control, protection of landscaping and
reduction in automobile encounters with deer. Deer control also provided
negative utility to some Ð those who liked to see or hunt deer and individuals
especially concerned with animal rights. It was not a pure public good,
because not everyone gained from having deer control. But deer control is
very much like a public good in that the bene®ts are pervasive and exclusion
from the bene®ts is not feasible. Because of the public and private services,
deer management provided an ideal subject for the investigation of the
3In many ways the issues facing deer management in Maryland mirror those faced in the
management of kangaroos in Australia.
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tions for the community that could be conceivably dwarfed by the
implications for the individual.
The surveying was done by the Survey Research Centre at the University
of Maryland, MD, USA. A random sample totalling 1531 households across
Maryland residents was drawn. A response rate of 65 per cent was achieved.
An additional 14 per cent of households had miscellaneous problems which
prevented them from answering the survey, including surveyors being unable
to contact the appropriate household respondent. There were 971 usable
records leaving an eective response rate of 63 per cent. Further details of the
survey are contained in Curtis (1998).
Interviewers for the survey ®rst asked respondents whether they wanted
continued deer population growth. Continued growth of the deer population
would lead to increased levels of property damage and be a threat to public
safety. Control of deer would reduce the threat of damage to almost all
households in the study area. Hence, there were both public and private
returns to the control of deer. Continued deer growth also has some positive
eects. More deer would provide increased hunting and viewing opportun-
ities for some. For the animal rights supporters, the control of deer would
provide negative utility. An individual who considers the interests of the
wider community may have been expected to vote in favour of population
control. A total of 512 respondents voted in favour of population control and
when they were subsequently asked a WTP question for a population control
program it could have been assumed, if we agree with the citizen hypothesis,
that they would respond as citizens. Our alternative hypothesis was that
individuals who voted in favour of population control may not have been
citizens, as de®ned by the Blamey et al. (1995) hypothesis, but individuals
acting in their own self-interest. Under the latter hypothesis public-minded
behaviour could be explained by altruistic motivations of these self-interested
individuals.
The following question, asked to sort out respondents with zero WTP for
deer control, began the contingent valuation component of the instrument:
Question A: Ten years ago, there were about 150,000 deer in Maryland.
Now, there are twice as many deer in Maryland ± about 300,000. This
growth means that deer are now easier to see in areas where people can
enjoy them. But, it also means deer now cause more crop losses, damage to
private landscaping, as well as damage to cars from collisions. And, it has
led to the spread of Lyme disease among people. Would you like to see the
deer population continue to increase?
Under the Blamey et al. (1995) hypothesis, respondents would have answered
question A in their `citizen role' considering the best interests of the
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invoked the respondent as citizen, and not just as a consumer. A citizen may
have responded either yes or no to this because some of the public action
(such as deer hunting or the viewing of deer) are positive, while others, and
this seems to be the preponderance of services, are damages. For similar
reasons a consumer with altruism may have responded either yes or no to
question A depending on whether the consumer would have bene®ted from
population control.
Following question A, the respondents were confronted with a CV
proposal (question B in the appendix) and, subsequent to this, respondents
were again asked if they wanted more deer (question C), but to consider only
themselves in answering:
Question C: If you consider only yourself, and not what has happened to
your friends or others, would you prefer that there were more deer?
This question was designed to determine whether respondents expressed a
dierent choice for direction of deer population change when asked not to
consider the interests of others. A respondent may have answered yes or no
to this question and still be a consumer, depending on how he/she viewed the
services from deer. Several points concerning the design of question C are
worth mentioning. The wording of the actual question in A and C dier; that
is, `would you like to see the deer population continue to increase?' versus
`would you prefer that there were more deer?'. The same exact question
wording was not used for two reasons. First, we wished to avoid irritating
respondents by appearing to ask a similar question again and consequently
losing respondent interest in the remaining survey questions. Second, the
design of question C was such that it forced them to consider their response
rather than summarily give a previous answer. We achieved this by using
slightly dierent but simple wording, which ultimately asks the same
information, and reversing the wording relating to the direction of
population change; that is, in the response to question A in which
respondents said they did not want continued population growth, question
C asks whether they wanted more deer.
4
We used the responses to question C to identify those who would answer
dierently strictly in their private interest than as consumers with altruism
[the latter of which are indistinguishable from the Blamey et al. (1995) citizen
respondents]. In question A respondents presumably assessed their altruistic
preferences as well as their preferences as consumers in choosing for deer
4The detailed debrie®ng of interviewers after the pilot survey gave no indication that
respondents had diculties interpreting question C and that respondents understood question
C pertained to themselves only.
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immediate personal interests and ignore any altruistic preferences. We can
identify respondents with altruism when the responses to questions A and C
dier. But not all individuals with altruistic preferences will be identi®ed.
Only cases in which the altruism varies from A to C will be revealed. Other
forms of altruism, such as altruism for one's family, may be constant across
A and C.
Question C was asked after the contingent valuation proposal (question B
in the appendix) so not to in¯uence the respondent in answering the WTP
question. Therefore, between questions A and C the respondent heard a
considerable amount of information on deer populations and their manage-
ment. It is feasible that this information could also have in¯uenced the
response to question C. All 512 observations to be used in the empirical
analysis initially expressed a preference against continued deer population
growth. Therefore, to test whether the same decision process was used to
respond to question C as to the CV question, we estimated a bivariate probit
model in which the ®rst equation explains the response to the dichotomous
choice WTP question and the second equation relates to question C. The
model estimated is as follows:
Probyes to CV question)  x1b
1  e1




2 are normal with mean zero, constant variances and
correlation coecient q. An estimate of q equal to zero would indicate no
unexplained correlation between the two equations and, except for common
covariates, the responses to the two questions would appear to be
uncorrelated. Therefore, if estimated q equals zero it seems reasonable to
assume that when respondents were expressly asked to consider only their
private best interest they responded accordingly.
The covariates in the bivariate probit model are the bid price, a
dichotomous variable taking the value 1 when the respondent heard the
sharp shooting proposal, and an `order of information' variable. The sharp
shooting proposal is one of two means proposed for controlling deer. The
other control method is a more innocuous (but more hypothetical) deer birth
control program. We expect the dichotomous variable to account for
dierences between the two control methods. The order in which deer
services were described in the survey may have aected responses. To enable
a test of whether this occurred, the order in which the information was
provided was switched randomly between respondents. Some respondents
heard about the bene®ts of more deer ®rst followed by the lengthier list of
damage caused by deer, others the reverse order. The `order of information'
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deer ®rst.
The estimated bivariate probit model is contained in table 1. As the order
of information variable is not signi®cant, we infer that individuals do not
appear sensitive to the order in which information was presented in the CV
questions. The bid price is important in the CV question but has no
explanatory power in question C, where we would expect the magnitude of
the bid price to be irrelevant. The coecient of most interest in this model is q
and the hypothesis that q equals zero cannot be rejected (v
2
1 = 0.078).
Reassured that respondents perceived the distinction between questions A
and C and answered in accordance with their preferences, we can use the data
from this survey to examine the consumer±citizen issue.
The responses to questions A and C are shown in table 2. Approximately 7
per cent of respondents appear to draw a distinction between what they
would choose initially compared to what they would choose if considering
only their private bene®t excluding any altruistic bene®ts. The motives
behind the initial response are not revealed and could be due to concern for
the community or altruistic preferences. The issue tackled in the remainder of
the paper is whether we can statistically distinguish preferences of respond-
ents with altruism (36) from other respondents (476).
Table 1 Bivariate probit model
Estimate Std. Err. Est./s.e.
Equation: Prob(yes to CV question)






Bid price )5.60 1.79 3.13
Constant 0.89 0.17 5.30
Equation: Prob(yes to question C)






Bid price )1.02 2.55 0.40
Constant )1.49 0.24 6.30
q )0.03 0.11 0.28
Table 2 Response to questions A and C
Chose more deer Chose fewer deer
Question A N = 512 N/A 512
Question C N = 512 36 476
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The model is a standard dichotomous choice CV model. The respondent is
confronted with a proposal for deer population control at cost A. The
respondent's utility function is u(q, y; x) where q is the deer population
control program, x is a vector of respondent characteristics and y is income.
Deer control is represented by q1 with a cost of A, and no deer control is
speci®ed by q0. A respondent that accepts the proposal receives utility
u(1, y ) A; x). When the respondent declines, utility is u(0, y; x). We specify
a linear indirect utility function:
uq;y;xa0q  a1qD  a2qx  by  eq
where eq is a random mean zero part of preferences, and the parameters
change from the status quo scenario to the scenario with deer control (except
for b, the marginal utility of income). Because only dierences matter with a
linear utility function, the income variable plays no part in the analysis:
Prob(yes)  Proba01  a11D  a21x  by ÿ Ae1
> za00  a10D  a20x  by  e0
 Proba0  a1D  a2x ÿ bA  e > 0:
This expression gives the probability of answering yes to the contingent
valuation question. The parameters are akak1 ) ak0.
The variable D represents a 1±0 dummy, identifying respondents who
revealedaltruisticpreferences.Theestimateoftheconstanttermintheindirect
utility function is a0 plus a1 depending on whether the respondent revealed
altruistic preferences. The error term ee1)e0 represents what appears to
be the random component of utility as observed by the researcher, although
not random to the individual. The a and b are the parameters to be estimated.
The objective of the analysis is to determine if the respondents identi®ed as
having altruistic motives have preferences for deer management that are
dierent than other respondents. To ®nd a statistically insigni®cant coe-
cient on the altruistic consumer parameter a1 would suggest that consumers
with revealed altruistic motives do not have preferences distinct from others
in the sample. The null hypothesis is that these preferences are the same; that
is, a1  0.
In a world where one admits altruism into preference functions, one may
expect that self-interested consumers with altruistic preferences make choices
that appear to be community-minded decisions. Our conjecture is that the
revealed behaviour of consumers with altruism cannot be distinguished from
the Blamey et al. (1995) citizen-minded behaviour. We can test whether the
preferences for individuals who have expressed no altruism are dierent from
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the null hypothesis, a1  0. Being unable to reject the null hypothesis in this
instance means two things for the citizen hypothesis. The ®rst is that drawing
on the citizen hypothesis to explain community-minded behaviour might not
be correct. Self-interested consumers make community-minded choices and if
the empirical test is unable to distinguish their preferences from others, such
as the Blamey et al. (1995) citizen respondents, then the citizen hypothesis
cannot solely be relied upon to explain community-minded behaviour.
Second, the empirical result would suggest that model parameters and
estimates of WTP of community-minded individuals are not dierent from
completely self-interested respondents in this scenario of deer management.
In such a case it does not matter which preferences prevail and contingent
valuation is a suitable method for assessing preferences for public goods.
5. Empirical results
For estimation we assume that utility has an extreme value distribution so
that the dierence in utility is distributed as a logistic.
5 Table 3 contains the
parameter estimates and estimates of mean willingness to pay for the deer
management proposals are presented in table 4. We are interested in the
estimate of a1 as well as the central tendency of WTP. Parameters for socio-
economic variables and project characteristics are not estimated, as they are
super¯uous to the thesis of the paper and would clutter the tables of
estimates.
6 The parameter estimate on the `with altruism'
7 parameter (a1)i s
insigni®cantly different from zero and the v
2 statistic for the likelihood ratio
test that respondents identi®ed as having altruistic motives express choices
for deer management that are dierent from other respondents is 0.0003.
This test shows that respondents who revealed themselves as having altruistic
motives do not have preferences for deer management that are dierent from
other respondents. Hence, while Nyborg (2000) shows that WTP values can
be dierent for these preferences, in our case there is no dierence, and so the
distinction is not important. One interpretation is that choices apparently
made in the interests of the wider community may be due to self-interested
individuals with certain kinds of altruistic motives. The citizen respondent
5We also estimated the same model with a normal distribution, with virtually identical
results.
6Models with these variables included were also estimated, the results of which do not
adversely impinge upon the conclusions of this paper.
7Alternatively, this may be interpreted as a parameter that distinguishes between preferences
for social welfare and personal preferences.
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community-minded choices in contingent valuation surveys.
Willingness to pay is calculated as a/b because the assumed distribution
was not truncated during estimation.
8 Due to the insigni®cance of the `with
altruism' parameter, a1, we ®nd that there is no statistical difference
between the estimates of mean willingness to pay for deer management by
identi®ed altruistic respondents and others. One issue raised by the Blamey
et al. (1995) hypothesis is whether it is appropriate to conduct bene®t±cost
analysis. We have made three estimates of mean WTP conditional on the
type of respondent; that is, altruistic motives or not.
9 In the ®rst row of
table 4 we estimate mean willingness to pay US$90 by the 36 respondents
who were identi®ed as having altruistic motives, which will be compared to
welfare estimates for the rest of the sample. Even with the small number of
observations the con®dence interval is quite narrow. For comparison we
estimate mean WTP for 476 respondents not identi®ed as having altruistic
motives. The estimate of US$98 lies in the con®dence interval of the estimate
for the 36 respondents identi®ed as having altruistic motives. In the third row
of table 4 we present the estimate of mean WTP for all respondents in the




Parameters Estimates Standard error Est./s.e. Pr |Est.|>0
b 0.02996 0.00344 8.71 0.00
a0 2.94 0.31 9.53 0.00
a1 )0.16 0.39 )0.41 0.68
Table 4. Mean willingness to pay
No. observations Estimate 90% Con®dence interval
Individuals identi®ed with
altruistic motives
36 US $ 90.6 70.1±117.3
Individuals not identi®ed with
altruistic motives
476 98.3 92.6±105.0
All respondents 512 97.7 92.3±104.1
8The con®dence intervals were calculated over 100,000 drawings from the parameter vector
according to the variance±covariance matrix estimated. This method is similar to the
simulation approach suggested by Krinsky and Robb (1986).
9The model was re-estimated without the altruistic parameter a1 for the three different
samples and conditional WTP subsequently calculated.
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respondents identi®ed as having altruistic motives. We conclude that those
responding without revealed altruistic motives would pay approximately the
same as those who had revealed altruistic motives, who in turn, are
indistinguishable from `citizen-type' respondents. It is eectively irrelevant
which preferences prevail as estimated mean WTP does not dier.
The failure to reject the hypothesis that a10 is something of a surprising
result. One would think that respondents who are otherwise equal would
behave differently if they were more altruistic. One possibility is that
respondents are altruistic towards members of their family, and this motive is
considered non-altruistic by some and altruistic by others. Regardless of the
reason, it highlights the importance of the issue raised by Blamey et al.




Understanding the motives of CV survey respondents is central to the task
of debating the legitimacy of CV. This should lead to a wider set of
models for responding to dichotomous choice questions. Blamey et al.
(1995) address the empirical problem by arguing that `citizen-type'
variables had greater explanatory power for dichotomous responses than
`consumer-type' variables. Our hypothesis is that evidence for the citizen
hypothesis is observationally equivalent to responses from individuals with
neoclassical preferences with altruism. We discover through the survey
process some respondents that were acting with altruistic motives but
could ®nd no statistical dierence between these and other respondents in
the survey.
In addition to the empirical analysis, we argue that it is not simply a matter
of deciding which hat, the citizen or consumer hat, a respondent wears when
faced with a decision. Sago (1988) and Blamey et al. (1995) argue that an
individual responds as a citizen in the best interests of the community when
the decision relates to public goods. But in many situations there is not a
clear dichotomy. The impetus for the eco-labelling movement comes from the
potential for individuals to combine their preferences for private and public
goods. The consumption of all market goods has implications for the
community, be it through employment, government services, morals or some
other avenue. Altruistic motives provide a rational explanation of why self-
interested people make choices that appear to be more bene®cial to the
10Our survey for Maryland deer management was completed after we became aware of the
Blamey et al. (1995) paper.
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is no dierence in the WTP for respondents who could be reasonably
classi®ed as citizens and consumers.
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Appendix
CV Questions Ð Question B comprised of either a sharpshooting or birth
control proposal.
(1) Sharpshooting proposal
A proposal being considered to control the deer population is to hire
professional hunters as sharpshooters. These sharpshooters will be instructed
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The sharpshooters will be safe to use in areas where people live nearby. The
objective will be to reduce [your county's] deer population by 10 per cent in
total for the next 5 years.
If this were to be used in [your county], it should reduce deer damage to
cars, crops and landscaping. On the other hand, there will be fewer deer and
the likelihood of seeing deer will decrease.
This proposal to reduce [your county's] deer population by 10 per cent
using sharpshooters would cost your household [$15, $30, $50, $75 or $100]
dollars in higher state income taxes for 1 year. Keeping in mind that you
would have [$15, $30, $50, $75 or $100] dollars less to spend on other things,
would you vote for it or vote against it?
(2) Birth control proposal
A proposal being considered to control the deer population is to use deer
birth control. This method of control can be used in areas where people live
nearby. Quali®ed personnel will be hired to administer the contraceptive by
methods that will avoid pain to the deer. This birth control will be used to
control the population in speci®c areas where damage is highest. The
objective will be to reduce [your county's] deer population by 10 per cent in
total for the next 5 years.
If this were to be used in [your county], it should reduce deer damage to
cars, crops and landscaping. On the other hand, there will be fewer deer and
the likelihood of seeing deer will decrease.
This proposal to reduce [your county's] deer population by 10 per cent
using birth control would cost your household [$15, $30, $50, $75, $100 or
$125] dollars in higher state income taxes for 1 year. Keeping in mind that
you would have [$15, $30, $50, $75, $100 or $125] dollars less to spend on
other things, would you vote for it or vote against it?
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